Shape the future of Lazy Summer DAO. Cast your vote on active protocol upgrades and treasury allocations now.
> **Connected RFC:** https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-revoke-curator-roles-across-all-fleets/905 > **Related:** https://forum.summer.fi/t/ba-labs-stepping-down-as-risk-curator-for-the-lazy-summer-protocol/899 --- ### 1. Overview: Revoke `CURATOR_ROLE` from **BA Labs (`0xa16f07b4dd32250dec69c63ecd0aef6cd6096d3d`) on every Fleet across all networks**, following BA Labs' [announcement](https://forum.summer.fi/t/ba-labs-stepping-down-as-risk-curator-for-the-lazy-summer-protocol/899) that it is stepping down as risk curator. Executed as `revokeCuratorRole(fleetCommander, account)` calls on each chain's `ProtocolAccessManager`. --- ### 2. Motivation: Per the connected RFC: with all Arks removed under SIP2.60, a Fleet has nothing to allocate between, so the curator mandate has no remaining function. It is a live permission that nothing is actively watching, on a protocol whose risk-management capacity is winding down and whose front-end sunsets on 31 August 2026. Two developments since the RFC make this concrete: * **BA Labs has publicly announced it is stepping down as risk curator.** Revoking the onchain role is the corresponding onchain act. * **The role holder enumeration is now [published](https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-revoke-curator-roles-across-all-fleets/905/3)** (thanks @halaprix for the role-decoding interface), so the call list below is complete rather than indicative. --- ### 3. Specification: | Parameter | Value | |----|----| | Action | `revokeCuratorRole(fleetCommanderAddress, account)` | | Account revoked | BA Labs curator: `0xa16f07B4Dd32250DEc69C63eCd0aef6CD6096d3d` | | Revocations | 14 (Ethereum 5, Base 3, Arbitrum 3, HyperEVM 2, Sonic 1) | | Networks | Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Sonic, HyperEVM | | Contract | `ProtocolAccessManager` per chain | | Selector | `0xe9296665` | | Authority | `onlyGovernor` → executes via the Timelock | | Execution | Base governor → LayerZero → destination timelock | | Risk level | Low (permission removal; no funds move; no role grants) | #### 3.1 Calls **Ethereum:** `ProtocolAccessManager 0xf389BCEa078acD9516414F5dabE3dDd5f7e39694` | \# | Fleet | Fleet address | |----|----|----| | 1 | LazyVault_HigherRisk_WETH | `0x2E6abcbCCeD9Af05bc3B8a4908e0c98c29A88e10` | | 2 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_WETH | `0x67e536797570b3d8919Df052484273815A0aB506` | | 3 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC *(exploited)* | `0x98C49e13bf99D7CAd8069faa2A370933EC9EcF17` | | 4 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDT | `0x17Ee2D03e88b55E762c66C76ec99C3A28A54AD8d` | | 5 | **LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC** *(exploited)* | `0xE9cDA459bED6dcfb8AC61CD8cE08E2D52370cB06` | **Arbitrum:** `ProtocolAccessManager 0xf389BCEa078acD9516414F5dabE3dDd5f7e39694` | \# | Fleet | Fleet address | |----|----|----| | 6 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC_2 | `0x71d77C39dB0eB5d086611a2e950198E3077cf58A` | | 7 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC | `0x4F63cfEa7458221CB3a0EEE2F31F7424Ad34bb58` | | 8 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDT | `0x98C49e13bf99D7CAd8069faa2A370933EC9EcF17` | **Sonic:** `ProtocolAccessManager 0xAFb8a8beA8F7CdB4b65437b0c5963dc7Cd270bC6` | \# | Fleet | Fleet address | |----|----|----| | 9 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDCe | `0x507A2D9E87DBD3076e65992049C41270b47964f8` | **HyperEVM:** `ProtocolAccessManager 0x38fB5a7fa70103dCd9e8A969f3975A77E0fE755f` | \# | Fleet | Fleet address | |----|----|----| | 10 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC | `0x252E5Aa42c1804b85b2ce6712cd418A0561232Ba` | | 11 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDT | `0x2cC190fb654141DfBEaC4c0f718F4d511674D346` | **Base:** `ProtocolAccessManager 0xf389BCEa078acD9516414F5dabE3dDd5f7e39694` | \# | Fleet | Fleet address | |----|----|----| | 12 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_EURC | `0x64Db8f51f1bf7064BB5A361a7265F602d348E0f0` | | 13 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC | `0x98C49e13bf99D7CAd8069faa2A370933EC9EcF17` | | 14 | LazyVault_LowerRisk_WETH | `0x2bb9ad69FEBA5547b7cD57aAfe8457D40bF834af` | --- ### 4. Risk Assessment: * **Technical.** Permission removal only. No funds move, no approvals, no role *grants*. Verify each chain's `ProtocolAccessManager` on its explorer before encoding a wrong AccessManager silently targets the wrong surface. Note Ethereum/Base/Arbitrum share `0xf389BCEa…` while Sonic and HyperEVM differ. * **Operational sequencing.** `removeArk` is `onlyGovernor` and runs through the Timelock, not the curator, so SIP2.60 does not depend on BA's curator role. But any curator-gated divestment or rebalance would. * **Governance/security.** Single-purpose, reduces privileged surface, grants nothing. Explicitly does **not** touch the Guardian module (being renewed under SIP0.3), `SUPER_KEEPER_ROLE`, `COMMANDER_ROLE`, or `ADMIRALS_QUARTERS_ROLE` a wider role teardown is a separate discussion. * **Reinstatement.** Re-granting `CURATOR_ROLE` requires a fresh onchain-approved SIP. --- ### 5. Voting: > If **YES** - revoke `CURATOR_ROLE` from BA Labs (`0xa16f07B4Dd32250DEc69C63eCd0aef6CD6096d3d`) on all 14 listed Fleets across Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Sonic and HyperEVM. > If **NO** - leave the roles granted.
| Parameter | Value | |----|----| | Fleets | `DAO_LazyVault_USDC_1`, `DAO_LazyVault_WETH_1`, `LazyVault_HigherRisk_WETH`, `LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC`, `LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDT`, `LazyVault_LowerRisk_WETH` | | Network | Mainnet | | Arks removed | 37 | | Unpause fleet | Yes — `LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC` only | | Set tip rate | Already `0` | | Risk mgmt | **mixed** — dao-risk-managed (2 Fleets) + ba-risk-managed (4 Fleets) | | Execution | Base governor → LayerZero (`dstEid=30101`) → mainnet timelock `0x447BF9d1485ABDc4C1778025DfdfbE8b894C3796` | ##### Actions (in order): `removeArk()` × 11 on DAO_USDC_1; × 6 on DAO_WETH_1; × 7 on HigherRisk_WETH; then `unpause()` + `removeArk()` × 1 on LowerRisk_USDC; then `removeArk()` × 6 on LowerRisk_USDT; × 7 on LowerRisk_WETH. **39 calls total.** ##### Arks removed: **DAO_LazyVault_USDC_1** — `0xd77F9a9F2b0C160dB3e9dC2Cce370c1a740C76fc` *(dao-risk-managed)* `MorphoVault-usdc-Gauntlet_USDC_RWA-1`, `MorphoVault-usdc-Smokehouse_USDC-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Clearstar_USDC_Core-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Steakhouse_High_Yield_Instant-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Steakhouse_Prime_Instant-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Steakhouse_Reservoir_USDC-1`, `SkyRewards-SPK-USDC-1`, `Syrup-usdc-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Yearn_OG_USDC_v2-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Steakhouse_3Fx_USDC-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Gauntlet_USDC_Prime-1` **DAO_LazyVault_WETH_1** — `0x0C1FBCCC019320032D9acD193447560C8C632114` *(dao-risk-managed)* `MorphoV2Vault-weth-Gauntlet_WETH_Prime_V2-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-weth-Steakhouse_Prime_Instant_V2-1`, `MorphoVault-weth-Steakhouse_WETH-1`, `MorphoVault-weth-Yearn_OG_WETH-1`, `MorphoVault-weth-Gauntlet_WETH_Prime-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-weth-Yearn_OG_WETH_V2-1` **LazyVault_HigherRisk_WETH** — `0x2E6abcbCCeD9Af05bc3B8a4908e0c98c29A88e10` `MorphoVault-weth-Yearn_OG_WETH-1`, `Spark-weth-1`, `CompoundV3-weth-1`, `AaveV3-weth-1`, `FluidLite-weth-1`, `Origin_ARM-weth-steth-1`, `Origin-weth-1` **LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC** — `0x98C49e13bf99D7CAd8069faa2A370933EC9EcF17` *(exploited Fleet)* `unpause()` — not before 2026-07-23T10:38:35Z (minimum pause time, now elapsed); then `Syrup-usdc-1` **LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDT** — `0x17Ee2D03e88b55E762c66C76ec99C3A28A54AD8d` `MorphoV2Vault-usdt-Sky_USDT_Savings_V2-1`, `AaveV3-usdt-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdt-Steakhouse_Prime_Instant-1`, `Spark-usdt-1`, `MorphoVault-usdt-Gauntlet_USDT_Prime-1`, `MorphoVault-usdt-Steakhouse_USDT-1` **LazyVault_LowerRisk_WETH** — `0x67e536797570b3d8919Df052484273815A0aB506` `Spark-weth-1`, `MorphoVault-weth-Steakhouse_WETH-1`, `AaveV3-weth-1`, `CompoundV3-weth-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-weth-KPK_ETH_Prime_v2-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-weth-Steakhouse_Prime_Instant_V2-1`, `MorphoVault-weth-Gauntlet_WETH_Prime-1` ##### Voting: > If **YES** - execute the above for the six Mainnet Fleets (remove all remaining Arks; unpause LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC so its final Ark can be removed). > If **NO** - leave the Fleets unchanged.
> **Connected RFC:** https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-operational-realignment-for-the-transition-period/875 --- ### 1. Overview: Reconfigure SUMR Staking V2 so the lockup system winds down cleanly, in two governor-only parameter changes: 1. **`NoLockup` bucket cap → `type(uint256).max`** (uncapped); staking remains fully open at the no-lockup tier. 2. **All six lockup bucket caps → `0`** (disabled); no new lockups of any duration can be created. 3. **`updatePenaltyEnabled(false)`** -> the early-unstake penalty no longer applies, so existing lockers can exit without a fee. > **No existing stake is closed, moved, or altered by this proposal, and no voting power is confiscated.** Staking stays open, so governance participation is preserved. --- ### 2. Motivation: https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-operational-realignment-for-the-transition-period/875 (A2) set out the case for ending the SUMR Staking V2 reward programs: SUMR emissions run to `periodFinish` and are not renewed, and the USDC revenue share is discontinued. It also stated the fairness principle this SIP implements, that **the early-unstake penalty should be waived first, so lockers are not trapped between an unrewarded lock and a penalized exit.** Poll A2.2 carried a separate signal on exactly that.  The bucket change applies the same logic one step earlier in the lifecycle. A lockup is a bilateral bargain: the staker forgoes liquidity for up to three years, and the DAO compensates that with a quadratic reward multiplier funded by emissions and revenue share. With both sides of that compensation ending, continuing to *issue* new lockups would bind users into commitments the DAO has already decided not to pay for. Disabling those buckets stops new entrants taking the trade; uncapping `NoLockup` keeps staking, delegation and voting fully available. --- ### 3. Specification: #### 3.1 Parameters | Parameter | Value | |----|----| | Contract | `SummerStaking` -> `0xcA2e14c7C03C9961c296C89e2d2279F5F7DB15b4` | | Network | Base | | Related | `StakedSummerToken` (stSUMR) `0x7cC488F2681cFC2A5E8A00184bfA94ea6d520D1c` | | Authority | `onlyGovernor` → executes via `SummerTimelockController` `0x447BF9d1485ABDc4C1778025DfdfbE8b894C3796` | | Execution | Base governor → Timelock (direct on Base hub, no LayerZero relay) | | Calls | 7 × `updateLockupBucketCap` + 1 × `updatePenaltyEnabled` = **8** | | Risk level | Low technically; the material consideration is governance/quorum (§4) | #### 3.2 Calls Function signatures, verified: ``` function updateLockupBucketCap(Bucket _bucket, uint256 _newCap) external onlyGovernor; function updatePenaltyEnabled(bool _penaltyEnabled) external onlyGovernor; ``` `Bucket` enum values, verified in order: | \# | Bucket | Lockup range | New cap | Effect | |----|----|----|----|----| | 0 | `NoLockup` | 0 seconds | `type(uint256).max` | **Uncapped — staking stays fully open** | | 1 | `ShortTerm` | 1 second – 14 days | `0` | Disabled *(already 0 by default)* | | 2 | `TwoWeeksToThreeMonths` | \>14 – 90 days | `0` | Disabled | | 3 | `ThreeToSixMonths` | \>90 – 180 days | `0` | Disabled | | 4 | `SixToTwelveMonths` | \>180 – 365 days | `0` | Disabled | | 5 | `OneToTwoYears` | \>365 – 730 days | `0` | Disabled | | 6 | `TwoToThreeYears` | \>730 – 1095 days | `0` | Disabled | `updatePenaltyEnabled(false)` — disables the early-unstake penalty. `type(uint256).max` = `115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935` (`0xff…ff`, 32 bytes). Cap semantics are explicit in the contract: `cap == 0` disables a bucket (any positive stake reverts with `Staking_BucketCapExceeded`); `cap == type(uint256).max` means unlimited. #### 3.3 Verified effects * **Existing stakes are untouched.** Bucket caps are enforced **only on the stake path** (`_stakeLockup` → `_wouldExceedBucketCap` → revert). `updateLockupBucketCap` writes `bucketData[_bucket].cap` and emits `LockupBucketUpdated`; it does not iterate positions, alter `lockupEndTime`, or move tokens. Setting a cap to `0` blocks *new* entries and does nothing to existing ones. * **Voting power is not affected by bucket choice.** stSUMR is minted **1:1 on the raw staked amount**. The quadratic multiplier (`WEIGHTED_STAKE_BASE + WEIGHTED_STAKE_COEFFICIENT × t²`) applies to the *weighted* balance that drives **rewards accounting only** - bucket caps are applied to the unweighted amount. Since `StakedSummerToken` is the `ERC20Votes` token, a staker's governance weight is their raw stake regardless of lockup tier. **Disabling lockup buckets therefore does not change anyone's voting power.** * **Penalty disablement is a clean boolean.** `penaltyEnabled = false` makes `calculatePenaltyPercentage` return 0. The penalty is *not* burned - `_handleTokenTransfersOnUnstake` sends the penalty to `treasury()`. Disabling it means early exits no longer route a fee to the treasury. * **Penalty being removed, for the record:** fixed **2%** if remaining lockup < `FIXED_PENALTY_PERIOD` (110 days), otherwise linear `timeRemaining / MAX_LOCKUP_PERIOD × 20%`, i.e. up to **20%** at three years. After lockup ends, and for `NoLockup`, the penalty is already 0. * **Reversible.** Both setters are governor-callable in either direction; a later SIP can restore caps or re-enable the penalty. --- ### 4. Risk Assessment: **Technical: low.** Two governor-only setters on one contract, on one chain, no relay. No funds move, no roles granted, no positions closed, no user action required. Failure mode is a revert. Guardian pre-review of decoded calldata. **Governance/quorum:** Voting power under Governance V2 is stSUMR, so it is unaffected by *bucket* changes. Removing the penalty gives every locked staker an unpenalized exit at once, and with rewards ending there is little reason to stay. A large voluntary exit would reduce total stSUMR and therefore quorum. **Economic.** Unpenalized exits may increase circulating SUMR and create sell pressure, and the DAO treasury is heavily SUMR-weighted. The treasury also forgoes future penalty income (which, with rewards ending, is a fee charged on people leaving a program the DAO has itself discontinued). Both are foreseeable consequences of the fairness decision rather than arguments against it. **Conflict of interest.** Delegates voting on this are voting on terms affecting their own staked positions and voting weight. Worth stating on the record, as RFC did for delegate compensation. --- ### 5. Voting: > If **YES** - set the `NoLockup` bucket cap to `type(uint256).max`, set all six lockup bucket caps to `0`, and call `updatePenaltyEnabled(false)`, per the decoded calldata published in this thread. > If **NO** - leave the staking bucket configuration and early-unstake penalty as they are.
> **RFC:** https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-operational-realignment-for-the-transition-period/875 --- ### 1. Overview: Revoke (or retarget to the Timelock) the onchain **TipJar streams paying non-Treasury recipients (Foundation, Block Analitica, Labs, and Guardians) across all chains**, so that 100% of any protocol tips accrue to the DAO treasury (the Timelock). This operationalizes the TipJar-consolidation direction flagged in https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-operational-realignment-for-the-transition-period/875, executed as a single-purpose treasury action with fully-decoded, Guardian-reviewed calldata. > **Note:** All `tipJars` have been `shake`n with the last accrual of the tips. --- ### 2. Motivation: https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-operational-realignment-for-the-transition-period/875 set the transition thesis to stop paying for outcomes the DAO can no longer produce, and bring the flows and assets it still holds under the Timelock. It also explicitly parked one item for a dedicated proposal. Retargeting any non-Timelock tip stream is a genuine consolidation action that belongs in a treasury SIP, not in that RFC, and it asked for the live per-chain `TipJar` configuration (Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Sonic, HyperEVM) to be read and published first, checking each stream's recipient and any `lockedUntilEpoch` constraint. This SIP is that follow-up. The rationale specific to the service-provider streams: * Tip **rates** have already been zeroed on the offboarded Vaults, but the TipStream **recipient configuration** still exists onchain. Leaving standing streams to Foundation, @BlockAnalitica, Labs Co, and Guardians configured means any residual or future tip inflow would still be split away from the treasury. * Each of these splits was designed for a growing, staffed protocol. Labs is winding down; the other mandates are being reviewed or restructured as part of the transition. Consolidating tips to the Timelock is consistent with the treasury-consolidation posture the DAO is already adopting. * With any update/relaunch of the protocol the DAO can reinstate any/all relevant tipStreams again. --- ### 3. Specification: | Parameter | Value | |----|----| | Action | Revoke / retarget non-Treasury tip streams to the Timelock | | Recipients affected | Foundation, @BlockAnalitica, Labs, Guardians | | Networks | Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Sonic, HyperEVM | | Treasury (Timelock) | `0x447BF9d1485ABDc4C1778025DfdfbE8b894C3796` | | Contract | `TipJar` per chain (see below) | | Function | `<remove/retarget TipStream` | | Lock handling | Respect `lockedUntilEpoch`; streams still locked are scheduled or handled in a follow-up (DAO Risk Managed Fleets) | | Net effect | 100% of protocol tips accrue to the Timelock | | Risk level | Low (config change; no user funds; no role grants) | #### 3.1 Execution For each non-Timelock recipient stream identified in the published config, on each chain where it exists, submit the TipJar's stream removal/retarget call so the recipient is removed (or its share redirected to the Timelock). Two constraints to encode correctly: * **Lock epochs.** Any stream with an unexpired `lockedUntilEpoch` cannot be revoked/retargeted until it unlocks. Such streams are either scheduled for execution at unlock or carved into a follow-up sub-SIP; they are called out explicitly rather than silently skipped. * This applies to [DAO TipJar](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEb24bE9427F8Bccd1E995608e7f30cCa99B6a121) which is locked until 18th of February 2027. #### 3.2 Tip Stream Configuration | Network | Address | | --- | --- | | Ethereum | [0x2d1A...a401](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2d1A2637c3E0c80f31A91d0b6dbC5a107988a401) | | Arbitrum | [0xBeB6...1C47](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xBeB68a57dF8eD3CDAE8629C7c6E497eB1b6b1C47) | | Base | [0xAd30...A374](https://basescan.org/address/0xAd30bc7E40f13d88EDa608A5729d28151FcAA374) | | Sonic | [0xa689...3E6c](https://sonicscan.org/address/0xa689599c43c30e20153d2a9ed3d263fb72853e6c) | | HyperEVM | [0xD6f6...A573](https://hyperevmscan.io/address/0xD6f6548cF8643303F8C6bc9f4fcEC6Ed57f9A573) | --- ### 4. Risk Assessment: * **Technical:** Removing or retargeting a stream is a configuration change on the TipJar; no user or vault funds are moved and no approvals are involved. * **Governance/security:** Single-purpose, no role grants. * **Economic:** Redirects a fee split back to the treasury; no market action, no depositor impact. --- ### 5. Voting: > If **YES** - Revoke / retarget the non-Treasury tip streams (Foundation, Block Analitica, Labs, Guardians) across all chains so 100% of protocol tips accrue to the Timelock, per the published per-chain TipJar config and decoded calldata, respecting `lockedUntilEpoch` constraints. > If **NO** - Leave the tip streams configured as they are.
| Parameter | Value | |----|----| | Fleet | `LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDCe` | | Network | Sonic | | FleetCommander | `0x507A2D9E87DBD3076e65992049C41270b47964f8` | | Raft | `0x2a828B0E5cB549eE568923E815D9A781b6f4F018` | | Arks removed | 2 | | Extra actions | 10 Raft calls (2 × socializeLosses + permission flips) | | Unpause fleet | No (not paused) | | Set tip rate | Already `0` | | Risk mgmt | ba-risk-managed | | Execution | Base governor → LayerZero (`dstEid=30332`) → sonic timelock `0x4c32A28AD95deaBc06bF7C83AdEbCF6fe6721ED9` | ##### Actions (in order): For **`Silo-market_8-usdce-146`** (`0x42aade02…`), token bUSDC-8 (`0x4e216c15…`): 1. `Raft.setSweepableToken(ark, bUSDC-8, true)` 2. `Raft.setNonSweepableToken(ark, bUSDC-8, false)` — lift blacklist 3. `Raft.socializeLosses(ark, [bUSDC-8], 0xB0F53Fc4e15301147de9b3e49C3DB942E3F118F2)` — sweeps **9,830 shares** 4. `Raft.setNonSweepableToken(ark, bUSDC-8, true)` — restore blacklist 5. `Raft.setSweepableToken(ark, bUSDC-8, false)` — restore whitelist For **`Silo-market_20-usdce-146`** (`0x5c841955…`), token bUSDC-20 (`0x322e1d53…`): 6–10. The same five-step sequence — `socializeLosses` sweeps **640 shares** Then on the Fleet: 11. `removeArk(Silo-market_8-usdce-146)` 12. `removeArk(Silo-market_20-usdce-146)` ##### Arks removed: `Silo-market_8-usdce-146`, `Silo-market_20-usdce-146` ##### Notes on the socialization: The permission changes are **symmetric and self-restoring** — each Ark's sweep flags are flipped, one `socializeLosses` is performed, then both flags are restored, so the end state equals the start state. Each `socializeLosses` names exactly one Ark and one token; no other Ark or token is touched. The amounts are stranded residue, not user principal. > **To confirm before posting:** the recipient of the swept shares, `0xB0F53Fc4e15301147de9b3e49C3DB942E3F118F2`, should be identified explicitly in this post (it is not a Fleet, the Raft, or the timelock). ##### Voting: > If **YES** - execute the above for LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDCe on Sonic (socialize the two stranded bUSDC residues, then remove both Silo Arks). > If **NO** - leave the Fleet unchanged.
| Parameter | Value | |----|----| | Fleets | `LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC_2`, `LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC`, `LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDT` | | Network | Arbitrum | | FleetCommanders | `0x71d77C39dB0eB5d086611a2e950198E3077cf58A`, `0x4F63cfEa7458221CB3a0EEE2F31F7424Ad34bb58`, `0x98C49e13bf99D7CAd8069faa2A370933EC9EcF17` | | Arks removed | 12 (1 + 10 + 1) | | Unpause fleet | No (not paused) | | Set tip rate | Already `0` | | Risk mgmt | ba-risk-managed | | Execution | Base governor → LayerZero (`dstEid=30110`) → arbitrum timelock `0x447BF9d1485ABDc4C1778025DfdfbE8b894C3796` | ##### Actions (in order): `removeArk()` × 1 on USDC_2; `removeArk()` × 10 on USDC; `removeArk()` × 1 on USDT. ##### Arks removed: **LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC_2:** `ERC4626-Sky_sUSDC-usdc-42161` **LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC:** `ERC4626-Fluid-usdc-42161`, `ERC4626-Gearbox-usdc-42161`, `MorphoVault-usdc-Gauntlet_USDC_Core-42161`, `MorphoVault-usdc-Yearn_OG_USDC-42161`, `MorphoVault-usdc-Steakhouse_Prime_USDC-42161`, `MorphoVault-usdc-MEV_Capital_USDC-42161`, `ERC4626-Euler_Arbitrum_USDC-usdc-42161`, `SiloManagedVault-greenhouse-usdc-42161`, `Silo-Swaap_Lend_susdx_usdc_127-usdc-42161`, `FluidFToken-usdc-42161` **LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDT:** `CompoundV3-usdt-42161` ##### Voting: > If **YES** - execute the above for the three Arbitrum Fleets (remove all remaining Arks). > If **NO** - leave the Fleets unchanged.